Benefits versus implications was something that struck me as I watched all 7 hours of the Blair interview yesterday (Sunday). The "Risk Assessment" was thorough but there was a lack of foresight into an impossibility becoming a reality: that Iran and AQ joined their bones together to strike at Iraq and the Alliance of UK and US. Blair admitted that lack.
The weighing in on a decision to invade was already set in Blair's mind as early as mid to late 2001, before 9/11. With the meeting in April 2002 on Bush's Crawford farm in Texas, the fate was sealed then, I believe. The Americans had already moved into position. Blair had till March 19, 2003 to convince the UN Security Council. He failed and well, the rest is history.
There are two sides to to this argument: one says (correctly) that Saddam needs to go- whatever the cost. The other is the need for legitimacy of an action against a known dictator. This was what was sort but in my mind, Blair had already made up his mind as early as January 2002 - a full year before the invasion. The argument for him was not that Saddam had WMD but that he had intent - on restarting the WMD program once he was able to get rid of the Weapons Inspectors. The war in Iraq was based on the premise of intent to restart a program that would see Saddam using lethal force at his will and bidding. Not on an actuality, because the UK and Un and US had ten years of putting up with Saddam's crap and so this was the only option-attack and attack. They had had enough.
I suspect Blair may have already known that Saddam had no WMD left.
As Blair repeatedly said in the Inquiry interview - his decision was based on intent. Therefore not an actuality and this is where I believe that the UN could not authorize invasion because it could not see actuality clear enough. Although Resolution 1441 could have added an attack clause but for some reason the vague language, and lack of legal insight prevented this and so Blair tried for a second resolution before March 2003 and that failed.
I learnt a lot from watching this interview. Decisions making, leadership, PR spin, Intelligence manipulating and also their somtimes accurancy and getting a number of people onto "the same page" (Blair quote).
Finally, this was a war that went horribly wrong. Should there have been an invasion? Yes and no. Was it legal? No. Was Saddam's intent real? Yes and no. Did Blair get it right? Yes and no. Was Blair under pressure from Bush? Yes. Was there a way out for Blair? No. It would have meant that the relationship with the US would sour for a long time after. Could the US had done it on their own? No. The unknown factor revealed itself later in 2004-2005 with the advent of Iran and AQ stirring the pot.
The weighing in on a decision to invade was already set in Blair's mind as early as mid to late 2001, before 9/11. With the meeting in April 2002 on Bush's Crawford farm in Texas, the fate was sealed then, I believe. The Americans had already moved into position. Blair had till March 19, 2003 to convince the UN Security Council. He failed and well, the rest is history.
There are two sides to to this argument: one says (correctly) that Saddam needs to go- whatever the cost. The other is the need for legitimacy of an action against a known dictator. This was what was sort but in my mind, Blair had already made up his mind as early as January 2002 - a full year before the invasion. The argument for him was not that Saddam had WMD but that he had intent - on restarting the WMD program once he was able to get rid of the Weapons Inspectors. The war in Iraq was based on the premise of intent to restart a program that would see Saddam using lethal force at his will and bidding. Not on an actuality, because the UK and Un and US had ten years of putting up with Saddam's crap and so this was the only option-attack and attack. They had had enough.
I suspect Blair may have already known that Saddam had no WMD left.
As Blair repeatedly said in the Inquiry interview - his decision was based on intent. Therefore not an actuality and this is where I believe that the UN could not authorize invasion because it could not see actuality clear enough. Although Resolution 1441 could have added an attack clause but for some reason the vague language, and lack of legal insight prevented this and so Blair tried for a second resolution before March 2003 and that failed.
I learnt a lot from watching this interview. Decisions making, leadership, PR spin, Intelligence manipulating and also their somtimes accurancy and getting a number of people onto "the same page" (Blair quote).
Finally, this was a war that went horribly wrong. Should there have been an invasion? Yes and no. Was it legal? No. Was Saddam's intent real? Yes and no. Did Blair get it right? Yes and no. Was Blair under pressure from Bush? Yes. Was there a way out for Blair? No. It would have meant that the relationship with the US would sour for a long time after. Could the US had done it on their own? No. The unknown factor revealed itself later in 2004-2005 with the advent of Iran and AQ stirring the pot.
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